Cards and the Sup Bowl -- The Initial Key to Beating
the RedBirds (Part 1 of a series)
Initial Key:� The Cards 4-wide
against the Stiller base defense, or some amalgam
thereof.
Unlike Bruce Arians, Ken Cheezenhunt has a brain, and he uses it.� Moreover, he�s seen, first hand, what can
happen when you spread out the Steeler base 3-4 defense
and render its run-stuffing abilities as useless as a spear in modern
warfare.� If Cheezen
decides to go 4-wide, it will cause extreme problems for Dick and company.�
The Stillers defense was,
schematically speaking, awfully lucky in this 2008 season.�� They never once faced an offense with enough
talent, savvy, experience, and skill to spread out the Stiller base and play 11-on-10.�� The last time this occurred was against the
Patriots in Dec. 2007, when Brady and company simply abused, humiliated, and
toyed with Dick LeBeau�s base 3-4 defense en route to
a 34-13 asswhipping.�
In the 2nd half of this blowout, the Pats never tried a
true running play the ENTIRE half, except for a couple plunges in
garbage time at the very end of the game.�
Nonetheless, Dick the Dullard kept sending out Fat Casey Hampton, or
Nick Eason, to do nothing more than paw and titty-joust
with the center or guard at an area about 18 inches deep in the
NE backfield.�� Dick wasn�t on the staff
during the 2002 opener, in which NE did the SAME thing to this defense, but he
should have been acutely aware of it, and he should have made an adjustment
long before the 9:00 mark of the 4Q, when he finally pulled his NT for most of
the remainder of the tilt.� The Stillers filed a
grievance with the NFL after this game,
complaining about the unfairness of having to play 10 on 11, but the
complaint fell on deaf ears with the NFL, as it
should have.�
The blueprint is
there.� Spread out the Stiller D, and
force Dick�s hand as to whether to keep a fat, pudgy, out of shape 350-pound
nose tackle in the game, or remove the fatass for
someone who can actually harass, chase, penetrate, and make plays all over the
field.�
The root cause of this
dilemma is the Cards� stockpile of playmakers who can
catch the ball, and run well
with the ball after the catch.�� Everyone
is keenly aware of former Pitt-star Larry Fitz, who
is dominating opposing defenses in a manner not seen since the heyday of Jerry
Rice.� Even when well covered, Fitz�s instincts, athleticism, body control, and hands are
more than enough to come down with the ball at an alarming rate.� It�s not just Fitz,
of course.� There�s Anquan
Boldin and Steve Breaston,
both of whom caught over 1,000 yards this season.� Toss in the ultra gritty, very reliable Jerheme Urban -- a poor man�s Wes Welker -- and you have 4
receivers that can give defenses fits.�
Add in the receiving ability of Edge James and Tim Hightower, and you�re
facing an uphill battle in the base 3-4.�
Note, of course, that the Cards aren�t an Al Davis offense that loves
chucking the ball deep on every play.�
Rather, they are content to oftentimes carve opposing defenses with
9-yard slants, which often turn into 15, 20, and 25 yard gainers with their
superb RAC abilities.��
We are keenly aware of
Dick�s love affair with the base 3-4.� It
is designed to stuff the smashmouth offenses of the
AFC North.� It is not, however, designed
to stifle a deep, ultra-precision, high-powered passing offense like the
Cards.� Having a pooped out, 350-pound
run-stuffing NT does nothing to stop Warner, Fitz,
and company.��
The Cards don�t run a
4-wide by nature, but I fully suspect Cheezenhunt is
going to go with his strength.� The solution?�� Dick
has a couple of cards to play with (no pun intended).�� He can pull Fat Casey, and use a front 4 of
Smith, Keisel, Harrison, and Woodley, along with 2 ILBs.� This has some risk, as the Cards could try to
muster a running game.� However, you have
to pick your poison -- do you want to give James 3.5 yards per carry, or Fitz 17-yard receptions against wide areas of open
acreage?�� I�d certainly prefer if the
Cards turn the game into a plungefest, and frankly,
the Cards don�t have the horses to plunge the ball the way the Titans do with
White/Johnson or the Ravens do with McClain/McGahee.� The associated tactic is to pull Foote for
Timmons. �This gives you some speed, both on
the blitz as well to limit RAC yardage on dumpoffs
and short curls & slants.�� This
could result in essentially a 4-2-5 alignment, with 4 defenders at the LOS, 2 ILBs, and 5 DBs.� The associated variation is to add a 6th DB
and use Timmons as a rusher in lieu of Smith or Keisel on obvious passing
downs.��
The beauty of this is that
the Stillers would be able to keep the max number of playmakers on the field at any
given time, while also capitalizing on their incredible depth &
versatility at DB and LB.� Not many teams
can roll out the likes of Townsend and Gay in the dime or nickel defense, in
support of a solid starting 4 (Ike, McFadd, Pola, and
Clark, who is the obvious weak spot.)��
Not many teams can sport the versatile, athletic barbarism of a LB corps
that includes Harrison, Woodley, and Timmons.�
Constantly going with slow,
feeble, non-athletic stiffs like Hampton and Foote is a recipe for
disaster.� We�ve seen it, as recently as
last December.� Playing 10 on 11 is a
recipe for disaster.� Dick has the
quick-footed athletic weapons at this disposal; the decision is his to make the
adjustment and force the Cards into something other than a pitch n� catch
scoring spree.� An interesting side-note
will be if Cheezen decides to go with a mere 3-wide, and see
if he can still exploit the base 3-4.�
With Foote and Hampton in the game, he�d have a decided advantage as
well.�
More keys will be added as
we lead up to game day.�
(Still Mill
and Stillers.com -- when it comes to the analysis of the