Introduction:

 

The following article may be somewhat disjointed; possibly, it would have better as separate pieces. In making your way, please consider this outline:

 

• Terms introduced, BPA, BAP and RFR.

 

• Limits of BPA and BAP defined; includes a tribute to the late Joel Buschbaum praising the taxonomy he laid over a standard prospect-ranking list.�� Criticizes standard ranking lists; evaluates reach, value, bust and find in terms of projection versus performance.� This section is somewhat tedious though, hopefully, the accompanying analysis of the league-wide class of 2000, as was projected and as has performed, is less so.

 

• Terms illustrated with examples from the local classes of �99 and �01; RFR defined, SLM added.�

 

• RFR proposed as a means for dealing with the upcoming draft; that proposal hedged.

 

• Various principles proposed and illustrated via revisions to the drafts of the Colbert Era 2000-02, all in fun.�

 

• Summary, outline of 2003 slotting.

 

Thanks to all who have posted their comments on my prior work here.� I appreciate your taking the time, especially as your notes are based in a high degree of football knowledge.� As Mill had his posters of the year, I�ll follow suite and, while intending no slight to others, want to co-award as POY Oregon Steve, Steeler Ray and StlrWalt for their long-term support.� Highly honorable mention:� Blackheart6, Beavis4, Mejeris (who reasonably disagreed with one piece), Robin Cole, stillpaul and yggy.� Gone but not forgotten:� Andy Mattson, Blind Official, Mad Mike, Nebsteeler, Scotto and Hesske. Excluded from any award as staff though otherwise deserving: Crazy for his breadth of: view and Trap for his tireless posting.� The guys who make it all go are Mill, in the dual roles of lightning rod and promo-czar, and Trivia, who does all the real work.� Again, thanks to all.

�

 

Draft theory and practice, recent examples:

 

From most accounts, we have it that any given prospect is selected on one of two basics.� Those are: BPA (best player available) or BAP (best at position (of need)).� Later in this article, I�ll introduce a third model, that being the �roster-fixing-reach�� (RFR) but, for now, let�s consider just the top two.� While BPA is generally praised and BAP panned, the fact of the matter is that both means may have their application.� Quite obviously, BPA brings impact-potential; at the same time, you can�t have gapping holes in your roster.� For example, David Carr looks like an impact-type, franchise QB but operating behind the O-line fielded in Houston last year, much of the impact Carr accomplished was ass-first into the turf.� Surely Capers and Casserly will work to get that fixed; it is not my purpose here to belabor the obvious but rather to suggest that there is some balance to be struck between the two modes.���

 

Except when it is apparent which prospect will make the best pro, it may not be obvious which is in fact BPA or even BAP.� Those lists ranking players from, say, 1 to 250 certainly have their merit but that resides in a judicious application, rather than slavish adherence.� This is exemplified in the fact that the differential in projected value (PV) of the players at the top of those lists, say, 1 through 5, versus those some twenty spots later is usually much greater than that between those listed at 21-25 and the following twenty prospects, at 41-45. More simply, the PV difference between # 1 and #20 is always greater than that difference between #20 and #40 and so on until we get to the infinitesimal expected value gap between say, the #160 prospect and that ranked #180.

 

The late Joel Buschbaum at PFW approached this when he overlaid taxonomy on his ranking list.� Mr. Buschbaum offered six useful groups.� Paraphrased, those were:

 

• Franchise type.
• Should become a Pro Bowl fixture and could be a franchise type.
• Should become a PB player.
• Should become a quality starter.
• Could become a quality starter.
• Has a chance to make a roster.

 

The Buschbaum system ranked all useful players within a numerical range of 5.0-8.0; each of the six classes covered 0.50 within that range.� Players had individual ratings and were accordingly listed in descending order; however, a cursory inspection any year would show that the numerical difference between adjacent prospects� ratings dwindled as the list lengthened.� Naturally, Mr. Buschbaum made errors, as do all prognosticators; however, the idea that there are distinct sets (or thresholds) within any lengthy iteration of prospects does have value.� Further, Mr. Buschbaum deserves praise for couching his set descriptions in probabilistic terms: �should�, �could� and �chance� accept the obvious, that we are talking about potential, not proven performance.� On that basis, let�s look at his projections for the class of 2000:�

 

• Franchise types:� ��������� (3) in all.
• PB fixtures:������ ��� ������� (2) in all.
• Should be PB:������������� (1) in all.
• Quality starters:������������ (24).
• Could be quality������� (62).
• Chance��� ����������������� (> 140).

 

That year, there was one round of �should be starters� or better, two of �could be starters� and, on the second day, projected potluck.� In general, that is true every year though in some cases, there are fewer franchise types or the �could be� guys are somewhat closer to �should be.�� Given that there are many more players in each descending group, the term �reach� would rightly apply to a team who, in the top of the 1^st round, selected a prospect some 30 spots downward; that term might be relevant later in day one but certainly on day two, it could not apply.� That so, any �reach� list (such as in the Huddle Report) which relies on a simple subtraction within individual rankings, rather than a consideration of overarching class, has only limited utility.� Naturally, the same is true for �values� similarly calculated.� In general, we can say that the �reach� or �value� designations shed meaning as the draft progresses.

 

Obviously, class distinctions are somewhat artificial.� In the Buschbaum system of 0.50 per, it is evident that players at the bottom of one are closer to players at the top of the next than those men are to others within their own �class.� For instance, in 2000, OT Chris McIntosh had a 6.00; a set below, OT Marvel Smith had a 5.90, as did OT Adrian Kleem.� Todd Wade was in the latter group too, at 5.76.� For the same position, the split within class was greater than the split between; considering that Wade has become the best pro of those four, we can see both the uncertainty accruing to prognosticating pro success and, given that, the possibility that a �reach� is not always a reach.��

 

Prospect lists project expected value, what actually happens may be different; thus the terms �bust� or �find.� Those have more relevance than either �reach� or �value� since the former pair relate to performance proven on the field while the latter are self-referential to some guru�s evaluation.� Since we know that it takes a couple years to evaluate a draft class, let�s look again at the 2000 group:

 

First round:� (31) players drafted, of those only two (RJ Soward and Trung Candidate) could be considered reaches.� (22) players drafted in this round seem to have established as solid starters, of those, (6) or so have Pro Bowl credits.� The other (9) could be considered busts, or disappointments; of those, Peter Warrick was in the franchise class; Thomas Jones was at the top of the �should be� set and Ron Dayne wasn�t far back; others there, including McIntosh and Sly Morris, have been injury-plagued.

 

Second round:� (31) players drafted including several workout warriors (Jerry Porter, William Bartee, Bobby Williams).� (21) starters (to include rising star Jerry Porter), as many as (10) busts, mostly DB.

 

Third round:� (32) players drafted including (9) starters, another (11) have been solid contributors but (12) have yet to factor much; the Steelers� twin picks, Clancy and Poteat are included in the latter group.

 

Draft oracles may measure themselves by the accuracy of their predictions but, quite obviously, those men working in the league�s War Rooms have a different standard.� They seek players and use their own lights to do so but from the above, we can see that (31) prospects selected on Day One have accomplished little or nothing to date.� Maybe, some of those players were reaches but surely most were not; we know this because, of the (92) prospects classified as �could be starters� or better, (83) were drafted on Day One.�� Further, of (160) players taken on Day Two, (22) have become starters, (2) have contributed as return aces, the other was punter Shane Lechler.� Of those (25), only (2) were in the PFW top 92; maybe, that could be construed as a criticism of the publication but, in fact, that is about as accurate as any of the type, and given the actual draft record cited above, may be about as useful as an average team�s draft board.� In sum:

 

• The terms reach or value are used in reference to prospect lists that, whether publication or pro, are far from exact.� That so, those terms have limited application.

 

• Given the uncertainty cited above, neither designation, BPA or BAP, is conclusive.� Early in the draft, several players on the board will carry equivalent projected values; that is, they are in the same �class.��� Later in the draft, equivalents cluster.� There are exceptions: franchise types who fall into the middle ten in round one; first day values who fall into the mid-second day but generally, teams are selecting from prospects within the same set.� However, it is worth noting that forecast errors can carry across class as is exemplified by the careers of 2000 franchise projections Peter Warrick and Courtney Brown.

 

• Since draft day 2000, about 2/3 of the prospects selected in both the 1^st and 2^nd rounds have emerged as starters.� That so, any team should expect to get players in those frames that quickly develop in that role; it follows that the 2^nd day types separate the average from great drafts.� By the numbers then: of (74) 2000 draftees who have become starters, (43) were selected in the first two rounds, (9) in the 3^rd, (8) in 4^th and (14) in the final three frames.� (125) of (254) players selected were drafted from the 5^th onward; about half the draftees but less than 20% of the starters.� Draft (1) starter anywhere in the last (3) rounds and you�ve done well; get (2) as did Green Bay in 2000 (drafting KGB in the 5^th and OG Mark Tauscher in the 7^th) and you�re way ahead of the game.� Note:� GB also drafted TE Bubba Franks in the 1^st, OT Chad Clifton in the 2^nd and OLB Nails Diggs in the 4^th.� Not bad.

 

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To solidify some of the preceding, let�s examine a well-known if regrettable incident here:

 

In 1999, the Steelers were drafting 13^th overall.� There were (5) QB and (2) RB who were sure to be gone before Pittsburgh reached the podium.� Add to those seven, two elite WR (Holt and Boston) and (4) premium D-side players (Kearse, Bailey, Claiborne and McAlister) for (13) in all.� It was clear then that the Steelers would have a chance at one of those; that was most likely to be Boston, McNown or McAlister.� Of the three, the Steelers wanted Boston but complicating their selection process was the fact that their OT position was in shambles.� Wolford and Strylzcek were done; the hideous troika of Stephens, Conrad and Anthony �Skates� Brown had unhappily crumpled and so, although the FO had brought in Wayne Gandy, (1) OT position still remained open.� That so, OT John Tait was certainly a consideration at 13; however, while a solid mid-first pick, Tait was not an elite type.� Using the BAP paradigm, Tait could be the guy but, under BPA, not and, as is obvious, no WR available @13 could fit either bill.���

 

Of the elite (13), Jevon Kearse was the last man standing.� However, per pure need (we might call this the shopping list method or SLM), @ 13, the Steelers were faced with selecting either the 3^rd WR or the 1^st OT.� Well, we know what happened; from that we might glean these points:

 

• Sometimes, the BPA is obvious:� I think we all understand that Jevon Kearse was the guy.� Kearse carried a top five rating, by the Buschbaum method, the Steelers jumped down (3) classes to select Troy Edwards.� Set-wise, that is the equivalent of selecting a FA value at the bottom of the first round though rating-wise (individual PV differential), it was �merely� the equivalent of selecting a mid-second day type @ the spot.�

 

• Usually, the BPA is not obvious.� It would have been ludicrous then to describe Edwards as the BPA @13 but it would unfair now to characterize him as a reach.� Both Troy Edwards and John Tait carried mid-first round ratings; considering just those two, BPA would give no results and that would have remained true if, say, McNown were available rather than Kearse.� Further, while the 3-5 WR prospects (Edwards, Kevin Johnson and Peerless Price) clustered fairly tightly, the drop-off from there at that position was steeper than at OT where as many as (8) players carried mid-1^st to mid-2^nd grades.� Those included: Tait, LJ Shelton, Aaron Gibson, Matt Stinchcomb, Solomon Page, Jon Jansen, and even Luke Pettigout and Kris Farris. Given that, the FO may have reasoned that the odds favored OT over WR in the 2^nd, when their turn was to come again.�� However, that didn�t prove out; OT Jon Jansen, whom the Steelers had targeted at #45, was gone but Peerless Price, whom they did not covet, remained.� Too bad as, on balance, Tait and Price would have been better than, say, Edwards and Kris Farris but, then again, with Jansen gone but Edwards in tow, the FO could move down (recall the Viking deal @ 45) to, indirectly, acquire Joey Porter.����

 

• The BAP isn�t so obvious either.�� Of the 3 WR listed above, two have been solid contributors with Price emerging as a star.� Of the (8) OT listed above, two (Gibson and Farris) have busted but the others have made their contributions.� Price was the last of the three WR selected; the best of the OT, Tait, Shelton and Jansen went 1,2, and 6 at their position.�

 

• Early-on, size flies and speed sticks:� After the elite WR were off the board, (6 or 7) OT were selected in the same interval as (2) WR with equivalent rankings.� Quality big men are at a premium, especially pocket punchers on the D-side and island pass protectors in the O-group.� That is why the Pro Bowl rosters are studded with 1^st round DT, DE and OT.� In contrast, the PB features plenty of 2^nd or 3^rd round and beyond QB, OC, WR, CB, LB and safeties.� Oddly though, while elite size goes fast, any useful speed is usually fully expended at the halfway point (say, +/- 130 overall) though some few functional size guys (interior O-linemen, rotation DT and dime DE) remain, along with highly functional QB and kickers.

 

Unfortunately, the Steelers drafted two of the three WR/OT busts listed above.� In my opinion, the Farris failure was totally predictable but that was not so for Edwards.� He didn�t figure as a #1 WR, nor did KJ or Price for that matter, but Toy did seem to have pro ability.� As for Scott Shields, well, he was a pure reach by any standard.�� Consider that in evaluating prospects, the (3) prime factors are productivity, level of competition and workouts (measurables to include size, speed, strength).� Then, we might write this simple equation:

 

• (Productivity x level of competition) x measurables.� Productivity is paramount but if we give the major conferences a coefficient of 1.0, the Sun Belt or WAC must be <1.0.� Properly, measurables would be used to confirm the first factor, never to project some future miraculous transformation in the play-for-pay ranks.� That is especially true early; later on, measurables may predominate. �Regardless, lacking confirmation by measurables, even big-time producers should get a pass.� Then:

 

• Edwards: (high production x <1.0 competition) x (<1.0 measurables).� Tooled Nebraska but otherwise played low level competition; quick but not fast, no #1 WR is quite that short.� At best a #2, a type that can be had later.

 

• Shields:�� (high production x < 1.0 competition) x (<1.0 measurables) Shields famously ran a mid-4.5 40 which, while fast for a 6-4 guy, is not fast for a safety.� At the last Combine, (14) safeties ran in the mid-4.4 to low 4.5 ranges, all faster than Shields.� Elite LB, like Arrington, Urlacher or Bullock are as fast; elite DE like Abraham, Peppers, Freeney or even Courtney Brown are as fast (in Freeney�s case, faster).� In evaluating this man as an athlete, the FO was far behind the speed curve; that exaggeration obscured level of competition issues attached to this player.� Presumably, WAC-play had concealed a predilection to avoid contact, which, along with merely average speed for the position, rendered this man worthless as an NFL defender.

 

• Farris:� (high production x 1.0 competition) x (<1.0 measurables).� Outland winner but Farris did just (5) reps at the Combine.� That�s bad for a D-back or WR; there is no way possible to project this man as an O-line contributor.� The Danny Wuerffel of OT.

 

If both BPA and BAP are usually obscure from view then, maybe, we need an additional model.� Just as hindsight assisted in panning the Steelers 1^st day Class of �99, so might we glean that new paradigm from the following, still local, example:

 

As is true this year, in 2001, the Steelers needs were on the D-side.� Those were, in no particular order, a rush DE, a replacement for Kirkland at ILB and a stout NT to anchor their run defense.� At the same time, they were facing the prospect of losing both their starting CB, their FS, and both Gildon and Holmes after the coming season.� Add Smith and Porter, who were to become RFA at that time and, well, there you go.� Still, the secondary need was a bit down the road; the more pressing concern was on the Front 7 where the D-line unit had fewer sacks in 2000 than the D-backs and, as was true for a couple years previous, had been unable to effectively close down the run.

 

In advance of the draft, most BPA-believers here were hoping that ILB Dan Morgan would fall to the Steelers @ 16 overall.� For what�s it is worth, my own view was that the B&G would be best served going D-line in the first and looking to the concentration of projected value at LB (Bell, Polley, Marshall, Hodge, Caver) in the 2^nd round.� That�s how it played out; Morgan, along with (4) DT (Warren, Seymour, Lewis and Stroud) were off the board when the Steelers� turn came up; as we know, the FO moved down (3) spots, acquiring a 4^th round pick which they used to move up in the 2^nd to get Bell and an additional pick, in the 6^th round, which they used (to no good effect) on Roger Knight.

 

The Hampton pick fit neither the BPA nor BAP paradigms; Hampton was generally ranked as 45-50 overall, it follows that there were 20-some players on the board (including Bell but especially Nate Clements) better suited BPA-wise.� Hampton was generally regarded as the 7^th or 8^th DT in that DT-rich class; with (4) down, the BAP-believers might have preferred Kris Jenkins, Shaun Rogers or even (God help us) Willie Howard.� Hampton was a legit mid-2^nd type but his selection @ 19 raised many an eyebrow.�

 

Not mine; I had Casey no worse than 3^rd at the position, behind Seymour and Warren but ahead (in Phantom-order) of Jenkins (shorter track record), Stroud (over-hyped at every level), Rogers (injury history), Howard (injury history) and Lewis (too small, Miami halo effect).� Regardless of that amazing divination, the fact is that the Hampton pick presents an example of our third selection paradigm, that being here defined as:

 

Roster-fixing-reach:� The selection of a player (perhaps) a round early if but only if that projects to improve the team at two positions.� In that respect, is distinct from a simple �reach�, which is the selection of a player (perhaps) a round early simply to fill a single gap.

 

Hampton projected to be a better NT than KVO; KVO projected to be a better 3-4 RDE than Henry.� Indeed, that improvement happened and, better at those two positions for two years now, the Steelers have had the best rush defense in football.� You might argue that is irrelevant in the outdoor Arena League that is today�s NFL but, quite obviously, a key factor in the last SB was that T-Bay could run the ball and Oakland could not, or did not.���

 

Maybe, Nate Clements could have been the Steelers roster-fixing- (non)-reach in 2001.� In that case, Scott would have been moved to FS (an argument previously made in my Secondary Review, circa Jan.2001).� Absolutely, Clements was on the board @19 (drafted by Buffalo @21); it follows that the B&G could have had both he and Bell.� Had they gone that way, then beyond doubt the Steeler secondary would have been better in 2002, if not 2001, with Clements in and Alex out but, IMO, it is doubtful that this improvement would have been of the kind that Hampton provided the run defense.� The B&G has been #1 in that area since Casey came on; I doubt their improvement against the pass with Clements would be on that order.

 

It is what is, Hampton is here and Clements isn�t.� The Steelers need D-backs this spring and, off the RFR paradigm, maybe a defensible strategy would be to draft the best CB available in round 1 (with Scott or DW moving over to FS) together with a higher potential small-school developmental tiger D-back later.� In the best case, some synergy would create the kind of pass-d gain we saw previously against the run; in that happy event, the Steeler defense would become absolutely impregnable.� Given the predilection displayed here in the Colbert Era for big school players, consider these four (listed alphabetically) as, potentially, RFR 1^st round CB:

 

 

Player	Tackles	INT	PD	# Years, remarks
Sammy Davis	174	11	26	Stats for (3) years, INT and PD down in senior season; presumably, this man was not tested then.
Dennis Weathersby	125	5	55	Stats for (4) years; excellent PD #, generated few takeaways and (31) T per season is not real good.
Eugene Wilson	175	10	53	Stats for (3) years, best balanced numbers; however, the fact that he was toasted both by Josh Reed and Lee Evans remains a concern, as does speed and attitude.
Andre Woolfolk	44	2	6	Stats for (2) years, from a production point of view, you�ve got to wonder what all the fuss is about with this player.

 

Though considered a reach, it is worth noting that Casey Hampton had all the measurables for success at NT; in fact, he is the ideal NT type and, probably, his lowly projected value in the 2^nd round resulted not from his own deficiencies but more from the fact that NT is a feature of the rare 3-4, not the then ubiquitous 4-3.� In contrast, every team needs CB and there, the Steelers� prototype varies little from those of most other teams.� That so, it figures that any CB on the board @ 27 will range farther from the Steeler-ideal than did Hampton and so, conceivably, any CB on the board will be a reach too far.� In that event, we might console ourselves with, say, Troy Polamula whose (6) career INT at USC do trump that (5) put up by Dennis Weathersby in the same conference, not to say the meager productivity of Andre Woolfolk in the Immense Twelve.��

 

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I�d like to illustrate a few points by re-casting the Steeler drafts of the Colbert Era.� This is not intended as a criticism of those; generally, the Steelers� have drafted well, especially in the early rounds.� IMO, their 2^nd day picks can be criticized but, from the top of the 5^th forward, we are talking potluck anyway.� Beyond that, hindsight is always 20/20 but otherwise ineffectual except as it may transmute experience into knowledge.� That is my purpose here; the salient points to be examined in this exercise are:

 

• Given the uncertainties involved, it is better to trade down than up.� By doing so, any team will increase their opportunities at, generally, equivalent prospects.� Exceptions to this could be trading up in the 2^nd, when 1^st round types may be available (Chad Brown, Jeremy No-Staat or Contact) or trading up in the 4^th when 1^st day types may be available.��

 

• Quality size goes out early; functional size remains late.� Quality speed closely follows quality size and useful speed ends somewhere around the mid-point, say, early 5^th.� Edge size (OT, DE) and DT leave very quickly, middle of the unit size (OG, OC) is available early or late; speed is available from the 1^st thru, at best, 150 overall.

 

The needs cited at the head of each year are an amalgam of the official version, and my own views.� Generally, I�ll try to follow the positional spots actually selected.�

 

2000:� Off consecutive losing seasons, you�ve got to figure the Steelers were in re-build mode.� That so, I�m accepting the then-rumored Jet deal as fact and so dealing out of #8 down to #18 and #27.� I�m losing Burress (and Urlacher, the BPA @ #8) so to get an additional opportunity at a solid starter.�

 

In 2000, the primary needs were WR, D-line and OT and depth/developmental prospects at QB, D-back, LB and interior O-line.� Of note, with the �Burress deal�, the Steelers had (3) top 40 picks; additionally, this was the year of the LB as exemplified both by the opening frame and the 4^th.�

 

1.18:� Chris Hovan, RDE:� High motor guy, smallish frame but good college production and great Combine.� This was a bad year for DT; the drop from Simon to Hovan was significant; from Hovan and Corn Griffin, the DT drop was abysmal.

�

1.27      Todd Wade, ROT:� SEC player as opposed to Smith (Pac 10) and Kleem (Hawaii).� Great Combine.

 

2.40:�� Jerry Porter, WR:� Size/speed developmental prospect; 4.3 guy at 6-2, 220.� Great Combine.

 

The next set of needs was NT and developmental DB.� That suggests Steve Warren and either Poteat or Lewis Sanders.� S/CB Greg Wesley was available too; a small school mover off a strong Combine, Wesley had better size than Poteat and better strength than Sanders.� To be honest, my board then had Darnell Alford and Steve Warren; however, hindsight, and the principles suggested above yield:

 

3.73:�� Laveranues Coles, WR:� Overmatch speed capability, has some character issues.

3.77:�� Greg Wesley, S/CB:� Likely would have begun here as a FS since Flowers had just been extended.

 

In the 4^th round, we�ll generally see some number of first day prospects.� In this year, Danny Farmer led the list but IMO then Farmer was just too slow.� The quality was at LB with Brandon Short, Nail Diggs, Isaiah Kacyvenski and Peter Sirmon still on the board.� However�

 

4.103: Michael Wiley, KR/CB:� Rumored sub-4.3 40 at campus workout.� Played RB at OSU but too small for a pro back.� Converted to CB, would be the fastest big D-back in the pool; regardless, should be a quality KR/ST player.��

 

5.137:� Adalius Thomas, OLB:� Haggans lacked all measurables but Thomas ran 4.59 at 270#.� Dime DE Kabeer Gbaja-Biamila was available here too.

 

5.163:� Mark Bulger, QB:� Having passed on Poteat and Short, hometown passer for those fast WR.

6.173:� Darnell Alford, OG:� First day value.

6.204:� Mark Trauscher, OG:� Big Ten brawler.

 

FA:� Jerry DeLoach and, per the Steeler scouts expertise, Hank Fraley and Dan Kreider.

 

Discussion, 2000 revision:� Overall, the preceding illustrates the principle of placing speed between size in essence, gaining Hovan to eliminate either reaching for Clancy or missing with Warren.� The trade-down principle gives Porter and Coles for Burress; otherwise, the first day simply swaps OT Smith for Wade and DB Poteat for Wesley.� As for the second day, well, I�d probably have taken Thomas in the 4^th (though he was available thru the Combs pick at 6a); I actually had Wiley targeted at 5a, the Haggans slot.� Both speed guys were available at either 4 or 5a; the order shown above is intended to approach the Steelers actual picks by position.��

 

The rules of engagement here say that what the Steelers actually got is the point of departure for the projection following.� That so:

 

2001:� Following a mediocre 9-7 2000 season, the Steelers remain in re-build mode.� As mentioned, the primary needs were D-line and LB with D-back a looming issue.� There were problems in the interior O-line too with Tylski a stopgap for Stai, Dawson gone, Duffy on the brink and Faneca two seasons from UFA.� The Steelers had no known quality at backup OT either but, IMO, the O-line yield in the mid-rounds or later is generally better inside than out.��

 

It is worth noting that some, including Green Bay GM Ron Wolf, believed there were no viable late round prospects in this class.�� Mr. Wolf, who had succeeded brilliantly on the second day in 2000, traded a fistful of similar slots in 2001 for a single second day pick in the year following.� Tie that to the Steelers multiple needs and, when the FO moved down on Day One, I hoped they�d stick with the additional picks.� Had they done so, we can presume they would have lost Bell and, on principle, this exercise will accept that fact:

 

1.19:� Casey Hampton, NT:� Steelers get better at two positions.

 

Pittsburgh was slotted at 50 but moved up to 39 to get Bell.� Good move but, then again, all the second tier CB prospects to include Stone 2.54, Dyson 2.60, Petersen 3.78 and Dwight Smith 3.84 were long gone by the 4^th.� This suggests that the hindsight pick would be at CB but I as had LB then, I�ll stick with:

 

2.50:� Sedrick Hodge, OLB:� CB speed, at 6-3 figures as a coverage type backer.

 

Aside from ST type speed, the prime 4^th round prospects by position are typically FB, MLB and interior O-line.� Two of three gives:

 

4.111:� Mathias Nkwenti, OT:� For reasons given on the O-side Overview, I�m fine with this pick.

4.112:� Ed Hartwell, ILB:� Timed slow, made plays at Western Illinois and with the Ravens.

5.146:� Chukky Okobi, OC:� With Fraley gone, Okobi was a reasonable alternative.� Otherwise Paul Zukaukas, OG.

 

In 2000, the 6^th round developmental D-linemen were Earnest Grant and Leif Larsen.� In 2001:

 

6.181:� Rod Bailey, DE:� Proved out; had high production at OSU but dubious measurables.

6.182:� Mario Monds, DL:� Up and down at Cincinnati, awesome measurables.

 

7. 223: Marlon McCree, S:� Chris Taylor was a fast WR prospect; however, his failure here illustrates the quality speed issue raised previously.� McCree ran slow at the Combine but has played okay in Jacksonville.���

 

FA:� Keydrick Vincent

 

Discussion, 2001 revision:� Whether Bell or Hodge, the Steelers� useful speed was limited to round two this year.� That is largely due to their pressing needs on both lines; additionally, lacking a 3^rd round pick the PS were denied any CB option in that frame.� Beyond that, there was a general lack of quality speed in this class; that so, the size-speed-size model held but the speed segment dwindled dramatically.�

 

For what it�s worth, the trade-down principle yielded Hodge and Hartwell for Bell.� Whether that is a win or not is a matter of opinion; taken over two years, the trade-down principle would have given Porter, Coles, Hodge and Hartwell for Burress and Bell.� IMO, that�s definitely a win, a point I�ll develop in the summary section following.��

 

Again, in revising the 2002 draft, the rules say we proceed from what the Steelers really did in 2001; that so:

 

2002:�� Coming off a 13-3 year, the PS were considered SB contenders for the near term.� The prime needs spots were: ROG, safety and a slot WR to replace Shaw/Edwards.� There was a continuing need for speed in the D-side reserves especially at LB and CB.� Deficiencies there had subverted their 2001 ST coverage group and that unit was primarily responsible for their flop at Heinz against the eventual champs, the NE Pats.� Beyond that, a big frame DE developmental type in the Smith mode and big body backup NT, as those may arise.

 

Drafting at 30, the FO might expect to see prime prospects at the safety, OG and TE positions.� However, last year the 3^rd TE was gone, the 2^nd safety was gone but all OG were on the board when the Steelers came to the podium.� Pressing the size then speed point, the FO went OG first and, ultimately, lost out on the quality DB remaining.� On the plus side, the Simmons pick probably will clear the way for Hartings to be let go whenever that cap needs arises; on the downside, the Steelers were ill-equipped to deal with the spread, no-huddle attacks to come.�

 

1.30:� Kendall Simmons, OG:� Kalimba Edwards was arguably the BPA; the BAP differential between Simmons, Fonoti, Gurode and Charles are slight but, beyond doubt, Simmons was a quality pick.

 

2.62:� A. Randle-El, WR/KR:� Highly productive high character player.

 

Having gone O-side, BAP for two rounds, the FO may have been well advised to turn to the defense and concentrate on players with the open field ability to contribute on ST immediately.� That means size/speed numbers that are ahead of the curve for any given position.� Given that notion:

 

3.94: Dante Wesley, CB/FS:� 6-1, 211# with 4.43 40.� Small school player with measurables identical to Lamont Thompson, a player I�d once considered @ #1 early in the evaluation process.� Others available include Coy Wire a converted LB who started at SS for Buffalo and had over (90) T but just (1) PD, Keyou Craver who was rated in the Rumph/Ross range at CB and Kevin Curtis a big, fast SS who was highly productive in college but got hurt in camp with SF.

 

4.128:� Wesly Mallard, SS: 6-2, 221#, 4.49 40.� OLB at Oregon and now backing up there with the NYG; however, listed as a SS type in Combine files and could be the avatar of Nick Barnett.� Other safeties, such as Ramon Walker or Marquand Manual, are smaller and slower; other positions include FB with Najeh Davenport and Jarrod Baxter or DE with Rocky Bernard and Aaron Kampman.� Excluding Walker, all were within 0.10 in the PFW 5.0 to 8.0 system; that so, none could be considered reaches.� PS picks Foote and Haynes were in the same range, as were the following two:

 

5.166:� Carlos Hall, OLB/Dime DE:� 6-4, 259#, 4.69 40.� Identical measurables to KGB, projected as a quality dime rusher and, off his 2002 maiden, looks to deliver.

 

6.202:�� Brett Keisel, DE:� Big frame DE prospect with good movement skills.� After Hope, Keisel was the 2^nd fastest defender drafted by the PS in 2002; on this list, would have been the 4^th.

 

Having drafted (4) D-side speed/size prospects, we might return to the O-group and, under some future value paradigm snatch:

 

7.212:� Luke Staley, RB:� 6-1, 227#.� Do-it-all franchise type RB at BYU who had a terrible knee injury in 2001 and will be rehabbing for a term.� No sure thing but, then again, no one drafted in the 7^th is a sure thing.� If he does come back as was, is a first round type player; if not, well, what�s been lost?� Of note: Tai Street and Terrell Davis were high potential players drafted late who came back, Anthony Poindexter never made it.�

 

7.242:�� Eric Heitmann, OG:� 6-4, 305#, (33) reps. A Stanford product who was considered a 3^rd round value but stock fell on injury rumors.� Smart guy with (33) Combine reps, could contribute one day.

 

FA: Josh Thornhill.

 

Discussion, 2002 revision:� It is an oddity of the 2002 draft that (4) D-line prospects with 1^st day measurables, though not 1^st day production, remained into the 7^th frame.� Those players are: Carlos Hall, Brett Keisel, Derrius Monroe and Brock Raheem.� Long time readers may recall that last spring I had each of the first three as 2^nd day, high potential picks.� In the preceding revision, I selected two; it could be argued that either constituted a reach but, considering the tiny PV differential between those men and the players that the Steelers actually selected, I don�t believe that term may be reasonably applied.

 

Accepting the actual first two picks as authentic values, the strategy employed in revising the remaining six could be characterized as roster balancing.� In 2001, the PS drafted no useful speed, excluding Bell.� That�s fine; there were DL and OL needs predominating then.� However, the need for speed was made obvious on ST in �01; that so, this 2002 revision focused on that point to the exclusion of dubious, or minute, differences in potential value.� It is worth noting that the FO performed essentially the same balance act in 2001; having acquired no useful size in 2000 after Marvel Smith, Mr. Colbert focused on the O-line in the mid-rounds, then added Rodney Bailey.� There is a balance to be had; there is a balance required; however, on the second day 2002, the PS FO exhibited no apparent commitment to this point, preferring a SLM approach predicated on collegiate productivity long after that could be reasonably projected (by measurables) pro-ward.

 

Summary:

 

In the Colbert Era, the PS has gotten excellent value from their 1^st and 2^nd round picks.� That list includes Burress, Marvel, Hampton, Contact, Simmons and Randle-El.� The constant has been high production in high-level collegiate competition.� The measurables vary:� Burress brings overmatch capability; to a lesser extent, that is true for Bell too; both Marvel and Simmons are solidly within the size/strength curve for their positions while Hampton and Randle-El are ideally suited for their particular, widely divergent niches.

 

However, the aggregate haul from the 3^rd round through the second day is not impressive.� IMO, this stems from three sources:

 

1. The (productivity x competition level) product works in the first couple rounds, when both factors are high AND the measurables stack up but is less effective later when that product diminishes AND the measurables slip towards zero.� For example, Kendall Simmons was the 3^rd best collegiate OT in his class (behind Mount McKinnie and Mike Williams).� That fact combined with his measurables suggests he would succeed inside.� In contrast, Larry Foote was a Big Ten star, very good production but far from top three nation-wide; add that to his miserable measurables and, well, there you go.

 

2. We know that more starters are taken in the first two rounds than in all other rounds thereafter.� Those players taken on the second day who develop as starters do so in what may be characterized as �middle of the unit� type roles.� DT are excluded from that generalization (although functional rotation DT (and dime DE) are available).� Instead, consider interior O-line, MLB and in-the-box safeties as included; add QB, TE and FB and, generally, that�s the 2^nd day roster of starters.� If you�re looking for starters (or immediately functional depth), those are the spots.� If you�re looking at ST contributors though, look at other positions.� Players on the edge (OLB, CB, dime DE) or in space (FS, WR) contribute on ST and day two, that�s all about the measurables.�

 

3. Typically, 2^nd day picks will fit near the bottom of the next roster, the Day Two focus should be on upside differentials between those players either to be drafted late or added as rookie FA and those already on the squad but at the roster tail.� This is especially true for edge guys.� Consider these FO selections:

 

Slight upside differential between ILB Larry Foote and FA ILB Josh Thornhill and Justin Ena.���

Slight upside differential between RB Verron Haynes and FA RB Antoine McCray�������

Slight upside differential between WR Lee Mays and Lenzie Jackson.���������������

No upside differential between OLB Roger Knight and Donnell Thompson�������

 

Now, as to a couple of the revised picks:

 

Enormous upside differential favoring OLB Carlos Hall over Justin Kurpeikis.�

Enormous upside differential favoring DL Mario Monds over Chris Hoke.��������������������

Considerable upside differential favoring OLB Adalius Thomas over Clark Haggans.

Considerable upside differential favoring SS Wesly Mallard over CB Lavar Glover.������������������

 

Here, upside should be understood to mean measurables, recalling the equation put forth in the �99 discussion previous; in the Colbert Era, the 2^nd day picks with the top upside have been Nkwenti and Keisel; unsurprisingly, those are my personal favorites.

 

As to the points tested in the preceding revisions:

 

• Trade down test, 2000:� The 2000 revision, trading away from Plax, still netted two top quality WR.� Add those to Ward and, clearly, that troika (Hines, Jerry Porter and L. Coles) could be as powerful as that truly fielded here in 2002.� Now, obviously, the Steelers could have had both Plax and Coles in 2000 had they the simple wit to avoid Clancy.� That so, their WR trio in 2002 could have been Hines, Plax and Coles; perhaps, that would have been the most powerful of all.� Regardless, we can imagine that, in both of those cases, the PS would have looked at CB rather than ARE in 2002 perhaps acquiring, say, Derek Ross or Andre Goodman.� Either would have improved the 2002 secondary and, given the equivalency of the (3) WR sets, that�s a plus.� It�s worth noting that the Plax deal netted Hovan too; that proposes an equivalency at WR with improvement on the base D-line, the dime D-line and in the secondary.� IMO, that�s a winning trade.

 

• Trade down test, 2001:� The Bell deal is harder to swallow.� Beyond doubt, Bell set the tone for the 2001 Steelers; however, injuries marred his second campaign and, recalling the D-side Overview, it is certainly possible to imagine a 4-3 Steeler unit with a solid LB corps of Porter, Hartwell and Hodge (as the TE-covering Julian Petersen).� Add Hovan with Hampton as the base DT, with Hovan, Smith and Bailey as the dime DT and now you�re talking.� Of course, there would be room for a new #92 in that scenario�

 

• First day when size flies and speed sticks:� From the revisions, I regard this case to be proven.� Looking ahead, the Steelers elite-type size needs are limited to DE (pocket-pushing 4-3 DT) or LOT.�� Generally, pocket-pushers go out early; however, Trevor Pryce, Kris Jenkins and Shaun King are exceptions to that rule; possibly, a similar prospect may available at #27 this spring.� That is less likely at LOT; the elite go fast and recent bottom of the first types (Mark Columbo) haven�t proved out.� Consider the �96 draft when Jon Ogden and Willie Andersen went top 10, leaving the Steelers to sort between LaLame and Andre Johnson of PSU.� At 27-30, there is usually unquestioned value in the inner O-line, possible value with DE/DT types but very dubious value at either LOT or elite pure rush DE.�� In 2003, the FO might consider 3-4 DE but will probably exclude LOT; that is, while the size-speed-size model held up pretty well in the revisions above, it is always possible to lift the first part, leaving speed-through 4 or-5, then size.�

 

• Second day, roster balancing:� As shown by example, this is a year-to-year deal.� After getting the must-haves in rounds one and two, the remaining frames go to sorting equivalent prospects by emphasis, first on speed then on size.� Per the 2002 discussion section above, the need for speed remains in 2003; the need for balance is eternal.�

 

• Second day, upside types to threaten players now on the roster:� This year, those developmental backups may include CB, OLB, dime DE, NT, TE, QB.

 

 

2003 by paradigm, a preliminary evaluation (or first stab).

 

The positional emphasis shown below derives from previous Overviews.� Quite obviously, the primary need is in the secondary, that so, those positions repeat in a way recalling the Steelers� class of �87 (CB, CB, offense, FS, LB, LB).

 

Pick	Size-speed-size	RFR	BPA	BAP
1.27   High probability for immediate starter but that diminishes as size increases.	DE	CB, with Scott or DW moving over to FS.	SS TE RB	QB
2.59   20-35% probability for immediate starter.	D-back	Not applicable	Slash type, as Stewart or Randle-El.� The leader in the clubhouse is WR/TE Teyo Jackson.	D-back

 

After that:

 

Pick	Size	Speed	By position, typically BAP fill-ins when no worthy measurables prospect is available.
3.92	Per roster balance, speed.	CB   OLB   SS	Power RB
4.125, pending compensatory.	Per roster balance, speed.	Dime DE, KGB sets the safe lower limit at 149 overall.   OLB   NCB   Safety	FB MLB TE Interior O-line too but why?
5.xxx	Excluding possible dime DE, d-side speed is probably gone.� Rotation DT (3-4 DE), NT is a decent bet.� WR or scat-back remote possibility.	Dime DE	QB, RB, TE, FB, WR.
6.xxx	Speed is gone on both sides; rotation DT, NT.	Not applicable, except as future value players with current injuries may present	QB, RB, TE, FB.
7.xxx		Not applicable, except as future value players with current injuries may present	QB, FB.